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5.10.1 Backup Facilities/Power

1. Conduct an Inventory of Backup Resources – “Conduct an inventory of resources that might be needed in an emergency.”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout New York City

2. Connect/Establish Backup Power – “Connect backup power to the right systems.”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout Great Lakes Region
   
   “Have backup power.”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout Great Lakes Region

3. Consider Redundancy in Emergency Response and Recovery Plans – “At a minimum, emergency response planners should consider designing redundancy into emergency response and recovery plans in several areas: the regional transportation network, agency personnel, communications, utilities, control centers, and equipment and supplies.”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: Cross-Cutting Study

4. “Determine the Benefits and Costs of Purchasing and Maintaining Backup Power – The amount of backup generation power available varied widely among agencies as each agency weighed the benefits and costs of maintaining backup power and equipment.”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout New York City

5. Determine the Components on Backup Power – “Reexamine what components of the system are on backup power.”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout New York City

6. “Locate Redundant Facilities Remotely”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout Great Lakes Region

7. “Test and Maintain [the] Backup Systems”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout Great Lakes Region

8. Use Alternative Emergency Operations Centers/Redundant Control Centers – “Emergency operations centers may be destroyed or rendered inaccessible in a major catastrophe. Alternative sites should be identified and prepared in advance. While emergency operations centers might be lost or impaired, knowledge acquired and networks built on personal relationships created in exercises will survive.”
   Saving City Lifelines: Lessons Learned in the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks
   
   “Redundant control centers helped when the New York City Office of Emergency Management Command Center was destroyed. The Port Authority was able to move to a backup control center in New Jersey. Both New Jersey Transit and New York City Transit were able to deploy mobile command centers. In response to the events of September 11, Mayor Bloomberg has proposed constructing and opening five “Help Centers,” with one in each borough that brings together representatives from city, state, and federal agencies.”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: Cross-Cutting Study

9. Use Redundant Utilities to Ensure Power – “In New York City, the loss of electricity severely hampered operations and recovery efforts. When the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel lost electrical power, its lights and ventilation systems failed forcing hundreds of motorists to abandon their vehicles in the tunnel and run towards Brooklyn as smoke and debris filled the tunnel. Redundant mobile generators allowed for the restoration of power to emergency control centers and allowed agencies to begin flood prevention efforts to preserve subway tunnels and communications networks from extensive water damage.”
   Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations—Cross-Cutting Study

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February 7, 2006
Publication #FHWA–HOP-08-015