Localized Bottleneck Reduction Program
Every highway facility includes decision points, such as on and off ramps, merge areas, weave areas, lane drops, tollbooth areas, and traffic signals; or design constraints, such as curves, climbs, underpasses, or narrow or non-existent shoulders. In many thousands of cases, these operational junctions and characteristics operate sufficiently and anonymously. However, when the design itself becomes the constricting determinant in processing the traffic demand, then an "operationally influenced" deficiency exists. Operational influences are tangible root causes of "recurring" chokepoint delays. Recurring backups are routine to the point of being predictable in cause, location, time of day, and duration.
The FHWA "Traffic Congestion Reliability" reports define congestion as "an excess of vehicles on a roadway at a particular time resulting in speeds that are slower - sometimes much slower - than normal or free flow speeds. (Congestion is) stop-and-go traffic. Previous work has shown that congestion is the result of six root causes often interacting with one another." The FHWA site Focus on Congestion Relief lists the six contributing sources as:
Only the first and second sources contribute to recurring congestion; i.e., they are tangible in design and function, and therefore, candidates for remediation. The remaining sources of congestion are nonrecurring and random. In this context then, a bottleneck certainly constitutes "congestion," but congestion cannot be said to be universally analogous to a "bottleneck". In much the same way that "paper" can be used to describe either a singular sheet or multiple sheets, "congestion" can be meant to describe the result of a local circumstance or an overarching systemic condition. It is not merely sufficient to explain that "high volumes" represent congestion, for this is a term that is relatively applied. High volumes, or at least higher volumes than designed for a facility, including even higher than the design volume plus a safety factor, will overburden any facility, regardless of whether operational influences exist or not. When too many vehicles compete along all segments of a facility, "congestion" will inevitably result, and is overarching. But when only determinant, subordinate segments of that facility are routinely over taxed, then "operationally recurring bottlenecks" within the facility are said to exist.
Among Webster's dictionary definitions of "bottleneck" are i) a narrow or obstructed portion of a highway or pipeline, and ii) a hindrance to production or progress. Certainly the elemental roots of a traffic bottleneck exist in these descriptions; namely, the narrow portion of highway and the hindrance to progress. However, a road need not "narrow" for a recurring bottleneck condition to result: e.g., witness a weave condition, sun glare, or a vertical climb. For that reason and others, in the context of traffic analysis, there are recurring and nonrecurring causes of bottlenecks, which invariably shapes one's definition. Note: across all FHWA sites "bottleneck" is often used interchangeably and idly as a catch-all definition including sometimes even meaning "congestion." One should recognize the context, and distinguish it appropriately as a "recurring" or "nonrecurring" bottleneck. Specific to this site, the reader is reminded that the LBR Program is dedicated to operationally influenced recurring bottlenecks.
In layman's terms, a bottleneck is distinguished from "congestion" because it occurs on a subordinate segment of a parent facility, and not pervasively along the entire facility. It is mandatory only for recurring bottlenecks that "traffic over-demand" be present. "Rubbernecking" past traffic incidents that do not require a lane closure, or simply driving into sun glare, often results in slowdowns even though excess traffic demand may not be present. The mere act of one or more lead vehicles slowing creates a rippling effect; a shock wave that reverberates back to vehicles that are following. In other words, this slowing could be the result of a traffic confluence or the rubbernecking. The slowing reduces room to maneuver, which self-perpetuates the shock wave. The problem begins to clear once past the incident, as vehicles begin to accelerate away, and maneuvering room downstream of the incident increases. One California study found that the mere optical illusion of a bridge that appears lower than it really is creates a recurring bottleneck on Interstate 880 north approaching 23rd Avenue. Truckers slow in anticipation of the "low" bridge, thereby forcing following vehicles to adjust. The location is independent of a classic operational deficiency and can be independent of volume. Nevertheless, the condition creates a bottleneck.
Good question! The FHWA Office of Freight Management and Operations is tasked with understanding the challenges that come with the increasing demand for freight transportation, and improving freight mobility and productivity. Understanding "freight bottlenecks" is a specialized study within that program area. Freight bottlenecks are both unique to this genre (e.g., steep upgrades, truck operating restrictions or limitations, delays at terminals) but also routine (e.g., stuck in traffic at notorious backups) in that they contribute to higher pass-through costs of goods. Therefore, a freight bottleneck is "freight stuck in traffic" but more to the point, the study of the economic loss of those goods being stuck in traffic. Getting freight moving around or through bottlenecks on trucking routes is a focus of that program. One might argue there is little difference in freight or any other user caught in a bottleneck; free up the bottleneck and everyone benefits. But highway service holds such great import to the trucking industry that "freight analysis" is justified as a unique area of study by the FHWA and peer organizations. Whereas, the LBR Program focuses on localized, operationally influenced bottlenecks, the Freight Analysis program focuses on major freight routes and the impact to the economy. If solving an LBR Program "bottleneck" includes solving a major freight-impacting location, all the better.
The LBR Program focuses on operationally influenced locations; that is to say, those that have an identifiable cause, resulting in recurring delays of generally predictable times and durations. The root cause of traffic flow degradation at the subject point of constriction is a potentially correctable solution. The following conditions either exist or help to identify a recurring bottleneck condition.
Fixing operationally influenced deficiencies applies to the fourth of the following four strategies available to combat congestion.
In layman's terms, "actively managing the traffic" means to make real-time adjustments to the facility to "manage" the speed, density or safety conditions thereon. Active Traffic Management (ATM) or Active Transportation Demand Management (ATDM) are brother and sister terms, wherein, the former is typically applied only to the roadway facilities, and the latter is typically a broader integration of a larger pool of related activities, like transit, parking, and driver-behavior elements. ATM enhancements involve some sort of "smart highway" feature that uses real-time speed, vehicle-count, or even vehicle-occupancy data to open or close certain lanes, adjust the speeds on the mainlines, or vary the candidacy to even be in certain lanes (e.g., HOV, HOT, truck-only, etc.) in the first place. In some cases, the special lane is free to certain qualifying vehicles (e.g. HOV's, special-tagged vehicles) but is variably priced for non-exempt vehicles; that is, the price fluctuates as the density fluctuates. In other cases, even the general purpose lanes may be managed; for example, by using ramp metering, reversible lanes, or allowing shoulder use during peak hours. Speed harmonization is the practice of adjusting speeds when congestion thresholds have been reached and slowing and queuing is imminent. Overhead signs on gantries lower the speeds – sometimes for the entire facility and sometimes in gradual reductions, say, every succeeding mile – to reduce the "shock waves" of stop and go traffic. Safety is improved and congestion can be relieved when the traffic stream is more-or-less traveling at the same speed. Typical accouterments of ATM include real-time traffic condition-recorders, variable pricing, congestion, or metering algorithms, changeable message signs (e.g., speed limits, HOV/HOT permissions, real-time changes in tolls), and "EZ Pass" or "FasTrack" card readers. Agencies operate and maintain these ATM lanes from a traffic operations center (TOC) or similar, which have 24/7, 365-day presence. In the case of ATDM (see above) the broader integration of elements like transit, parking disincentives (to dissuade folks from driving and encourage use of public transit, et al) and trip-choice behavioral changes (telecommuting, ridesharing, etc.) can "shift" or soften peak-travel time periods, and can have a positive effect on congestion mitigation efforts.
If poor planning "causes" congestion, then wouldn't good planning defeat congestion? Yet congestion is pervasive; ergo, just about all planning must be poor!
We can almost hear the planning community gathering their torches and pitchforks at that statement! Like most debates, there are probably many facets to this argument. On the one hand, some pundits may point to the strict geometry of a plan (e.g., cul-de-sac neighborhoods vs. grid streets; mixed-use development vs. single-use zoning) while others may focus on the socio-economic aspects of a plan (e.g., car-free cities vs. downtown activity centers, etc.) to claim that the plan is or isn't working as intended. There will always be planners who favor opposing tenets just like there will always be Republicans vs. Democrats, preservationists vs. industrialists, and paper vs. plastic. In our view, as the end-users and managers of the traffic network, it matters less whether the original plan tenets were met, but whether they were managed properly. Actually (and to some degree, regardless) the planning may have been a resounding success but the management of that planning may have failed. Unless one can definitively assign "poor" planning practices (e.g., negligence, unqualified skills, etc.) then at worst, "planning" occurred which may have contributed to congestion**. Most likely, "planning" occurred which requires better management of demand.
Poor "anything" begets the unintended opposite of the original intention. Plans are vetted by a review board and experts, and then adopted by vote. It would be a stretch to say that the plan they adopted was either intentionally poor or even resultantly poor, for one can't imagine a planning panel that isn't knowledgeable of the local history, dynamics, economics, population and business trends. They obviously are going to adopt a plan that they favor and which presumes trends and forecasts. So why then would that plan fail? Actually, it may not have failed from a business, renewal or growth standpoint, but ironically it may be overly successful as evidenced by the demand that may result. With regards to that demand aspect, congestion may "result" but it is most likely the management challenge of that demand that "causes" congestion.
Be careful not to confuse demand with congestion. The former is inherent in any plan, while the latter assumes a component of overburden. That overburden is known as recurring congestion and may be systemic (i.e., overarching or regional) or local. Systemic congestion overwhelms the entire infrastructure network, and may be a result – but not a cause – of planning, while localized congestion overwhelms unique subordinate facets of that network for short and predictable durations, and is more closely tied to tangible operational and design limitations. Mitigating the latter congestion may seemingly reduce the former, but not necessarily in the reverse, for localized chokepoint problems would exist with or without systemic congestion. The same subordinate location that suffers recurring congestion is congestion-free for the bulk of the day, indicating if you will "not so bad" planning. Pundits are eager to assign blame to the planning, when it may be the infrastructure (and management of same) that is not keeping up with demand; for example, in urban areas, is the transit component fully engaged? Are there capable refuges for deliveries, parking, and interconnectivity? Are signals optimized? Do exclusive turn lanes exist? Is the downtown pattern of one-way streets working? The density of all that planned residential and commercial activity must be managed properly. Often, the resulting congestion is a failure (at worst) or a challenge (at best) in managing that activity. In our estimation, congestion is ascribed to have a supply/demand cause and effect, and less-so a planned/unplanned one, for hopefully no one "plans" congestion. There are a myriad of dynamic forces that shape any plan, including execution over time, sprawl, urbanism, gentrification and sustainable development, or more precisely, "non" sustainable development. The good news is that those locations are a design fix away from being cured; something that can't be said about systemic congestion or nonrecurring congestion. The bad news is that it may take much money or right-of-way to fix it. Being of the supply/demand genre, the demand can be muted by adding more supply, improving the efficiency of that supply which exists, or inducing demand-mitigations. But note that neither systemic nor local congestion is necessarily corrected by mere planning absent management of same, which is an inverse way of saying that "planning" alone probably didn't cause either in the first place.
**One must exclude nonrecurring congestion from this discussion, as the congestion derived by those events – e.g., incidents, weather, work zones, special events – are less predictable and disappears when the event disappears. [ Return to note **. ]
The first step in bottleneck remediation is identifying bottleneck locations and the root causes of the bottleneck. Sometimes, the problem is evident, intuitive, or anecdotal. However, within multi-mile corridor congestion, travel demand models can assist in Identifying, separating, and analyzing bottleneck dynamics within the corridor. Traffic analysis tools can mathematically identify the problem areas by analyzing road segments for congestion or poor levels of service. Freeways with traffic detection use archived data to identify where and how often bottlenecks occur, and how severe they are. Historical data is used to determine if the problem is growing or receding.
Determining the root cause of the bottleneck can be accomplished with a range of tools. Travel-time runs and videos of problem areas can be used to pinpoint and measure deficiencies. Micro simulation tools can provide a detailed analysis of the specific attributes of the bottleneck(s) and can assist in determining the impact of alternative solutions. When conducting bottleneck analysis, care should be taken to ensure that:
Here is a sampling of remediations that would apply to low-cost, quick-fix, operationally influenced bottlenecks. (Note: other solutions not mentioned here might exist for larger bottlenecks or systemic corridor congestion.)
In a 2006 survey of state and local agencies, the most frequently mentioned operational bottleneck improvements were ramp metering, auxiliary lanes, and introduction of high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes. To what degree these are "low-cost" is for the agency to decide. Certainly, other remediations may serve other bottleneck problem areas.
The knee jerk reaction might be "lack of money." But that's everyone's first complaint about, well, most every problem! In visiting with many states to ascertain if they have a bottleneck-specific program or similar that targets chokepoint congestion, we have found a sampling of reasons.