Drills, Tabletops, or Exercises
A number of drills and exercises were held for various participants in preparation for the NSSE, including two DHS tabletops and a functional exercise. These events helped to define the roles of the operations centers and how they would communicate with each other and their staff. The Denver Office of Emergency Management also conducted its own EOC drill. Prior to the event planning process, Denver’s emergency management and traffic engineering personnel already knew each other and collaborated regularly; these personal relationships facilitated joint training events.
All public works staff, including transportation personnel, received ICS training, a standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach that is part of the NIMS curriculum. This training platform was standard and widespread throughout the region with many partners receiving training. NSSE planners focused the training for many of the field staff on managing crowds and protestor activity (e.g., unchaining protestors, routing marches, ensuring enough space to prevent riots). The Managing Civil Actions in Threat Incidents curriculum, developed and administered by the DHS, served as a helpful and worthwhile training reference for handling large-scale protests, including the development of a crowd management plan. Staff also participated in FEMA’s Integrated Emergency Management Course (IEMC). Of the 3,200 police officers involved in the NSSE, the majority went through the training program, which required a yearlong process. Other staff also participated in the program, including planning or operations focused training depending on job function.
Incident command training was already standard for all emergency management agency personnel. The management level institutionalized the importance of this training, which passed down through to the field level, which also receives regular training. Little transportation-specific training was conducted in anticipation of the NSSE. Staff responsible for transportation issues, including field staff from the Department of Public Works, were already well versed in handling transportation issues, including detours and road closures on a regular basis.
Transportation Equipment/Supplies
The Denver TMC normally operates 16 hours per day, 7 days per week. However, the TMC increased its operating hours to 24 hours per day for a 2-week period leading up to the NSSE. The TMC became one of several command centers around the city with representatives from the Department of Public Safety, Denver Police, and CDOT, among others. The team took advantage of the TMC’s existing region-to-region connectivity to facilitate coordination among jurisdictions. While the TMC was responsible for dignitary and delegate transportation, the Federal MACC coordinated event and delegate security. The TMC used the region’s extensive CCTV system and shared relevant information with other centers. TMC staff found the ability to stream video to other command centers highly useful.
The Denver emergency management team recently acquired WebEOC, an emergency operation management software suite that provides remote connectivity through the Internet. WebEOC served as a common communication platform and ensured continuity of operations among all personnel.
Denver and its regional partners did not own all of the necessary equipment and physical resources necessary for the event, so additional equipment was brought in from around the state, rented, or purchased, including DMS, jersey barriers, and traffic cones. For the equipment that could not be borrowed, a rental agency with a five-state regional reach was able to mobilize its entire excess inventory for the NSSE. The process for mobilizing all of the equipment required extensive planning and long lead times.
Manpower
Despite the massive scale of the NSSE, the 2008 DNC did not require a substantial influx of additional staff at the TMC or EOCs, although it did require existing staff to work many additional hours. The TMC itself used three overlapping 8-hour shifts to ensure a 24-hour operation. Throughout the NSSE, the DPW crews were always on duty to ensure they were available when needed. However, when not needed, crews were assigned duties outside the NSSE’s perimeter. Thus, crews remained busy but also on hand to solve problems when required. Having the staff and equipment already in place allowed for improved response time. Additional personnel from surrounding jurisdictions as well as state-level resources were on standby to provide additional manpower on an ad hoc basis. Due to years of clearing snow from Rocky Mountain winters, DPW management were used to supporting work crews during long shifts with little sleep including preparations to feed and clothe staff.
Although the DNC required few additional dedicated transportation staff, it required many additional security personnel. To support the massive NSSE, the city coordinated a large influx of an additional 3,200 police officers including 1,000 Denver police and 2,200 from partner agencies. These police officers had representatives in the relevant coordination meetings, most of which involved providing NSSE security. Extensive planning was conducted to determine which officers would be responsible for which tasks.
The federal government provided a $20 million grant in support of the NSSE, most of which was used for funding backfill and overtime expenses for personnel.
NSSE Security and Transportation
Part of the related security plan also included identifying multiple security zones. A “hard” perimeter was set up in the vicinity immediately surrounding the Pepsi Center.
A hard perimeter is a specified area the USSS designates based on factors that contribute to the safety and security of the event. The determination for the location of these perimeters is determined by highly trained members of the USSS who examine issues such as blast zones, points of vulnerability, ingress and egress routes, and many other factors. The hard perimeter closes off both pedestrian and vehicular traffic inside the restricted area unless the individual and/or vehicle have the appropriate credentials to gain access. This included transportation planners and managers as required. Most security zones were relatively small. Besides the Pepsi Center, they were often limited to specific delegate hotels. Even on the evening of then Senator Obama’s acceptance speech, the area was accessible to transportation staff up to an hour before the speech. In response to the security plan, the transportation plan was developed to allow dignitaries to move from security zone to security zone quickly and safely while minimizing disruptions to the general public’s ability to move freely. The plan gave additional consideration to providing the public with detours around security zones as required.
The majority of the individuals involved in the planning and operations of the event were already well vetted and had received background checks as part of their employment, including police, fire, and emergency management officials. Therefore, the credentialing process for allowing these individuals access to sensitive plans and areas was fairly straightforward.
Access and Functional Needs
The planning process for the NSSE gave additional consideration to accommodating special needs individuals. Golf carts, wheelchairs, and other mobility devices were on hand at the NSSE to ensure mobility. However, certain locations had issues related to insufficient special needs access or people not knowing how to access the special needs vehicles. RTD’s bus fleet was already wheelchair accessible, so considerations for special needs patrons using public transit were already in place.
May 2011
Publication #FHWA-HOP-11-012
