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2.0 Summary Of VPPP Projects And FindingsThe purpose of this section is to synthesize key findings extracted from the detailed summaries of selected VPPP project case studies included in the Appendix. These key findings are provided across six categories of projects and form the basis for overall conclusions and implications presented in Section 3. The project categories are:
The 24 VPPP Project case studies summarized in Appendix B cover pricing project categories encompassing the range of project types categorized in the FHWA Value Pricing Pilot Project Quarterly Reports. Some of the projects are feasibility or pre-implementation studies; others entail fully implemented and evaluated programs; others are experimental pricing trials. The summaries presented in Appendix-B are a selection from all the pricing projects that have been funded or granted authority to toll through the program. These case studies were selected for a variety of reasons, including: variety of project type; depth and breadth of available evaluation material; range of relevant project experiences and outcomes; range of success or failure along key implementation and outcome variables; and variation in location across the U.S. The case studies include: road pricing projects (pricing on new capacity, HOT lane conversions and on existing free roads) and controlled field tests (variablization of fixed costs, pay-as-you-drive insurance, time and location based automobile charges); non-road pricing projects (carshare, parking pricing/cash out); and cover both implemented projects and studies not culminating in projects. Pricing Project Category 1: HOT Lane Conversions With PricingHOT Lane (High Occupancy Toll Lane) Conversions are HOV lanes allowing vehicles not meeting normal occupancy requirements to “buy-in” to the lane by paying a toll varying by time of day or level of congestion. HOT lanes allow drivers to use high-speed, uncongested HOV lanes either by meeting minimum occupancy requirements, or by paying a toll. Like variable pricing on New Tolled Express Lanes and Existing Toll Facility Pricing, described later in Section 2, the HOT Lanes generally use variable pricing to control traffic demand, reduce peak period congestion and to ensure that HOT lanes provide premium traffic service conditions to all users, both existing HOV users and new paying customers. HOT lane projects are intended to make better use of existing capacity on HOV lanes and create a new traffic option in the corridor being served. A side benefit may be that a shift of traffic to the HOT lane may reduce congestion on the general-purpose lanes. ProjectsThe HOT Lane conversion projects summarized here include: I-15 in San Diego; I –10 & US 290 in Houston; I-394 in Minneapolis; I-25/US 36 in Denver; and SR 167 in Seattle. All were started with similar goals, with some variation in emphasis. The earliest HOT conversion was the I-15 “FasTrak” Project in San Diego implemented in mid-1990s. The project grew out of concerns about growing traffic on the freeway, significant under-utilization of the existing HOV lanes (only 600 vehicles per hour per lane at peak - well below half the high-speed capacity, while the mixed traffic lanes were operating at heavily congested levels) and the desire to fund expanded transit service in the corridor. Another important formative goal was to maintain the level of service in the HOT lane without slowing down or inconveniencing HOV travelers. Tolls vary with the level of congestion in order to maintain free-flow traffic conditions. Fees can vary in 25-cent increments as often as every six minutes. Motorists are informed of the toll changes through variable message signs located before the entrance to the FasTrak Lanes, allowing motorist choice between Express lanes or free lanes. The normal toll varies between $0.50 and $4, but during very congested periods it can be as high as $8. The average price paid per trip typically has been under $3 and seldom goes above $4. All transactions are electronic. Pricing is based on maintaining a Level of Service “C” for the carpoolers. Overhead antennas read a transponder affixed to the inside of a vehicle’s windshield and deduct the toll electronically from the driver’s pre-paid account. The Houston “QuickRide” HOT Lane projects on I-10 (Katy Freeway) and US-290 (Northwest Freeway) were created because of concerns about congestion, but in this case heavy congestion in HOV lanes. The I-10 HOV lane initially started allowing only buses and vanpools, then opened to carpools with 2 or more occupants, but grew congested over time. Subsequent restriction to 3+ carpools (peak period) led to excess capacity and the eventual policy of pricing 2-person carpools in 1998. A similar approach was introduced on the US-290 HOV Lane in 2000. Operations and pricing show some unique characteristics. The HOV lanes are reversible and free access is restricted to vehicles with three or more people during peak periods. Two person carpools can use the lanes by paying a toll between 6:45 – 8:00 a.m. inbound on both the Katy Freeway and US 290 and outbound 5:00 – 6:00 p.m. on the Katy Freeway. Single-occupant vehicles are prohibited. Two person carpools pay a $2 per trip. As in San Diego, the QuickRide project is completely automated and no cash transactions are handled on the facility. The HOT Lane project on I-25/US-36 in Denver started in 2006 with preset pricing by time of day. Its goals were similar to those of San Diego’s I-15 project, but with the added interest in generating revenues for general corridor improvements. For the I-394 Minneapolis HOT Lanes, begun in 2005, the main objectives included increased corridor capacity and throughput, reduced congestion, creation of a new travel option for solo drivers willing to pay a toll, and improvement of highway facilities and transit service in the corridor. The goals were achieved with the use of “dynamic pricing” (varying with congestion levels as often as every three minutes) while maintaining good speeds for transit and carpools (by policy, speeds in the MnPASS Lanes must remain above 55 miles per hour, 95 percent of the time). Finally, the SR 167 project grew out of an interest in testing the HOT concept in the Puget Sound region. Study and planning led to SR 167 as the best test case for results applicable to the region. The project has just become operational in May 2008. The public sector is lead operator of HOT lane projects, though one involved the private sector in development and some contract with the private sector for operations and administration functions. Minnesota Department of Transportation operates the I-394 HOT lanes, but the project developed through a design-build arrangement between the state of Minnesota and a private firm. SANDAG, the regional metropolitan planning authority, operates the I-15 HOT lanes and contracts with a private firm for operations. I-10 & US-290 are operated by the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County (Houston Metro), which administers all HOV lanes in the region. The I-25 project is operated by a nonprofit business center within the Colorado Department of Transportation. Washington State DOT operates the SR-167 HOT lanes. Volumes of use and size of facilities summarized in the following Table 1 indicate the scale of the HOT lane conversions. Projects are less than 15 miles in length with use and transponder sales as shown in the table. Major expansions and/or ties to regional HOT networks are planned for several systems. The San Diego I-15 lanes are being extended to 20 miles in the median. The Houston I-10 will be expanded and plans call for a network of managed lanes. (See Project Category 2: Pricing of New Express Lanes for details). Table 1: HOT Lane Conversion Projects
The earliest projects began with simple technologies and pricing schemes; later, these and other newer projects have used more advanced technology and pricing. For example, I-15 began with a paper permit test system (ExpressPass), then went on to electronic tolls in 1997. Initially, operations relied on limiting monthly permits to 500 ($50). Then, in 1998, a per-trip fee was instituted, using transponders compatible with all California toll facilities, and adjusted dynamically based on time of day and traffic levels. The early I-10 also began by limiting the number of priced vehicles to a target of no more than 600 vehicles per peak hour. The project also charged a simple flat fee per rush hour trip, though transponders were used from the outset. As a relatively new project, the I-394 not only employs transponders and dynamic pricing, but special transponders in police vehicles track cars entering the HOT lanes. A tone tells enforcers if the traveler has a valid transponder. The more recent I-25 started with variable pricing preset by time of day and a transponder system compatible with an existing toll facility (E-470) in the region that also services transactions. FindingsThe Travel and Traffic effects of HOT lane conversions are well documented and favorable. The most extensive evaluation was carried out on I-15 in San Diego. Before conversion in 1988, the I-15 HOV lanes were very underutilized with only 600 vehicles per hour per lane (representing less than half available capacity at high speeds) at peak while the mixed flow lanes were heavily congested. Average daily traffic was around 9,200. With the HOT conversion, average daily volume on Express HOT Lanes increased by approximately 125 vehicles per month. Evaluators concluded, “By the end of 1999, the Express Lanes were much better utilized than before the start of the project.” There was a large increase in carpooling from the beginning. By 2004, total daily traffic on HOT lanes had gone up to more than 21,000. The impact on mixed flow lanes was hard to sort out. Peak volumes slightly decreased compared to pre-project in 1996, while the peak volumes were increasing on a comparison corridor, I-8. The difference with I-8 trends is significant, but I-8 has no HOV lanes and travelers with different demographics, so comparison with the I-15 general-purpose lanes is not definitive. Pricing maintained LOS C in the HOT lanes, as required by policy. Also, there was significant reduction in SOV violators in the HOT lanes, probably due to more enforcement and some previous violators buying into the lanes. While HOV volumes moved up and down during the course of the evaluations, volumes still were greater than before project. Also, the majority of carpoolers interviewed during evaluations did not feel adversely affected by the HOT Lane program. HOT lane users reported savings up to 20 minutes compared to main lane travel. Transit ridership in the I-15 corridor increased about nine percent during the evaluation, probably due in part to new bus service. However, outside influences may have been at work too since ridership increased 23 percent over the region at the same time. Travel and Traffic evaluations of other HOT lane projects are also positive. On I-10 in Houston, the addition of the HOT caused HOV2 volume to increase 40 percent, while the HOV3 volume changed very little. Also on I-10, the total volume on the HOV lane increased by 21 percent during the AM peak. Average speed on general-purpose lanes was 25mph, while average speed on the HOT was 59 mph (over 17‑minute time saving for 13 mile trip). On U.S. 290, relative travel time savings were 11 minutes for a 15-mile trip. Surveys indicate that most HOT users formerly traveled in single-occupant vehicles on the general purpose lanes, suggesting positive impacts on traffic there. Not unexpectedly, there also was a significant shift of 2-person carpools from the general purpose lanes to the HOT lane. Diversion of bus, vanpool and 3+ occupant carpoolers to the HOT was between 5 and 8 percent of the HOT lane trips. On the I-394 HOT lanes in Minneapolis, peak hour volumes increased from 9 to 33 percent of the corridor volume after HOT conversion, and despite increased volume, travel speeds in the lanes have not decreased. Speeds in the general-purpose lanes increased up to 15 percent during peak rush hours, with 600-1000 fewer vehicles at peak due to the shift to HOT lanes. On I-25/US 36 in Denver, preliminary estimates indicate between 10-15 percent of all daily person trips occur in the HOT lanes at full highway speeds, while the adjacent general-purpose lanes experience stop and go traffic during the peak periods. For SR 167, projections estimate throughput will increase, with about 13 percent more vehicles traveling the corridor daily. Estimates are 38 percent more vehicles will use the HOV/HOT lanes, while preserving high-speed express trip conditions for buses, vanpools and carpools. A technical issue pertaining to HOT lanes has required particular attention: quick and safe access and egress to/from HOT lanes; and lane separation from general-purpose lanes. Unlike early HOT lanes projects, access to and egress from multiple entry/exit HOT lanes are requiring careful attention and planning. Weaving through several lanes of traffic to use slip ramp entrances may pose safety problems, and may exacerbate congestion on the regular lanes. On the other hand, if direct connector flyover ramps are provided to allow direct entry and exit without having to weave through the regular lanes, construction costs rise precipitously, affecting financial feasibility of the HOT lanes. Findings pertaining to Revenues and Financial Feasibility suggest revenues can cover operating costs, typically are devoted to operations and corridor improvements and, in some cases, have been used to support transit and rideshare services. However, the toll revenues in some of these projects probably fail to cover all of the initial capital outlays associated with pricing project implementation (typically these have been covered by federal VPPP grant monies) and one case suggests revenues can be sensitive to a competing facility. By 2004, The FasTrak lanes were carrying over 5,000 toll-paying vehicles daily. The rest, approximately 17,000 vehicles, were buses and HOVs with two or more occupants. During the 2004 fiscal year I-15 collected $2.4 million in toll revenues. Approximately $1 million of the revenues fund the Inland Breeze express bus service that operates in the corridor. The remainder is used to fund enforcement on the HOV lanes by the California Highway Patrol, to maintain the electronic toll collection (ETC) system, and for the operation of the Customer Service Center. Revenues have covered operation costs of about $100,000 per month (about $5.00 per account), including toll operations, replacement of transponders and pricing equipment as well as enforcement and administration. More recently, I-15 has added an account maintenance fee and transponder fee to cope with declining accounts and revenues apparently due to the opening of an alternate route (SR 56). With the new route came less SOV/FasTrak usage of the I‑15 lanes and corresponding reduced program revenues. For the much smaller Houston HOV-2 buy-in projects on I –10 & US 290, toll revenues from a few hundred daily vehicles cover only costs of servicing accounts (approximately $100,000/year), with revenues generated by the program between 1998 and 2003 totaling $417,734. Capital, marketing and start-up costs associated with the pricing project were covered by federal value pricing demonstration funds and enforcement and enrollment services already in place at Metro. On I-394 in Minnesota, revenues average $4,400 a day in toll and fee revenue, sufficient to meet operating expenses. Again, transit support is part of the program. The first 50 percent of net revenue is devoted to transit improvements, the remainder is used for operations and corridor improvement. On I-25/US 36 in Denver, first year toll revenues are between $1.25 million and $1.5 million and revenues from violation fees and fines approach $600,000. In 2007, total monthly revenues, including tolls, fees, and fines were $222,762. As with I-15, revenues are designated for transportation improvements in the corridor, including transit, vanpool, and carpool services. For SR 167 in Seattle, opening year toll revenue is estimated to be $1.5 million, increasing to $2 million in 2014. Preliminary capital costs of HOT conversion are estimated to be recovered by net annual toll revenue within 11 to 12 years. The conversion of existing HOV lanes to HOT lanes might appear to be financially attractive, since construction costs for new lanes are avoided. However, experience with projects under development suggests that the I-15, US 290 and Katy Freeway HOT lane projects may not be easily replicated. Unlike these HOT lanes, few existing HOV lanes are barrier-separated. In many cases, neither barriers nor buffers exist between regular lanes and HOV lanes, requiring plastic pylons (as on SR-91) or paint striping to separate HOT traffic from regular lanes (as on I-394), options which may raise safety and convenience issues in some areas among motorists, lane operators and enforcers. Regarding Public Attitudes and Involvement, projects typically are initiated after considerable public outreach and stakeholder involvement, with changes being made along the way in response to public reaction. The I-394 project in Minneapolis involved perhaps the most long-running outreach process. The project took more than a decade of attempts in the region, beginning with a failed proposal for I-394 in the mid-1990s. Finally, a task force of local elected officials, citizens and community leaders combined with public surveys, meetings and focus groups led to the project. I-394 also provides an example of making changes in response to public reaction. When the lanes opened initially, there was an increase in general purpose lane congestion in the non-peak direction since before the project all vehicles could use the HOV lane in the reverse-peak direction. Public outcry prompted MnDOT to change the operating policy. I-15 provides another example of change along the way. The tolls were reduced in peak shoulders in 1998 due to operator and public concerns about excessive traffic at peak periods and an attempt to shift some peak users to the off-peak shoulders. In Denver, a feasibility study before project start up found little interest or support for HOT lanes. But after an extensive outreach and informational campaign with businesses, employers and commuters, acceptance was sufficient to begin. Latest assessments show interest and support is strong, probably due to the perceived decline in current and foreseeable transportation funding. Once the Minneapolis project started after many failed attempts, reactions turned favorable: a January 2002 survey found that 57 percent of Minnesota drivers support the HOT concept. The same transition from resistance to acceptance was found in Houston. Reactions at public meetings and focus groups were mixed, with some fearing shifts of bus riders to carpooling, unclear commitment of revenues and agency inability to operate and enforce the project adequately. Focus groups recommended against the project, but planning continued taking heed of public reaction and decision makers finally authorized a pilot. A survey reported by Burris in 2004 suggests that 70 percent of current users and 67 percent of former users were supportive of allowing single occupant vehicles to travel on the HOT lane at a higher toll. The acceptance level is sufficient to support an expansion plan. See New Priced Express Lanes in this Section. Several projects underscore the role of stakeholders. Evaluators of the I-15 concluded that a local mayor was vital to successful start up, as were policies directing revenues in part to transit expansion. Focus groups, surveys and public meetings for I-394 did not gain requisite consensus until a task force of elected officials, community leaders and other stakeholders was formed. For SR 167, continuous stakeholder involvement accompanied public assessments to bring about an acceptable project. Stakeholders made up of affected jurisdictions, advocacy groups and corridor users met over two years while community meetings and varied outreach events were held. Findings did not uncover anticipated concerns about impacts on low-income people, and businesses perceived the value of trip reliability, as did all constituents. At this time, there are no foreseeable obstacles to start up. Equity and Environmental Issues have not been a barrier to start up or continuation, and impact studies on both issues are generally positive. On I-15, as mentioned above, user and stakeholder concerns about the potential elitist character of the project arose in the first year, but diminished with time as users across all income groups used the facility. By the final evaluation, such concerns were minimal. A telephone survey of I-15 corridor users conducted in the Summer/Fall of 2001 found that corridor users did not consider equity to be a major issue or obstacle to implementing pricing on an expansion of the original project called “managed lanes.” The majority of those interviewed in the telephone survey (71 per cent) felt that pricing the lanes is “fair” for travelers on the main lanes. Furthermore, 66 per cent approved of the currently operating HOT lanes, and 71 per cent believed that tolls are an effective way to manage demand. Both users and non-users of the dynamically priced I-15 HOT lanes supported the use of pricing. Support was high across all income groups, with the lowest income group expressing as much support as the highest income group (about 80 per cent). Evaluators also found while emissions grew for I-15 with increased use, they grew 3-5 times more for the control corridor. For I-25/US 36, public outreach leading to implementation did not uncover critical concerns regarding equity or other social impacts, nor have they arisen since. On I-394, the first attempt at HOT lanes (1997) met resistance in large part because of public belief only the rich would benefit. A second attempt about ten years later succeeded in part because advocates contended (pointing to evidence from San Diego and elsewhere) that all income groups value time savings and reliability for certain trips (worsening congestion and a shortage of transportation funds also were important to success, evaluators contend). Surveys of corridor users find a relatively small difference in income between those who do and don’t own transponders: 75% of owners had incomes over $50K/year, compared to 68% of non-owners. Concerns and complaints about equity have not been significant since start up. Air quality monitoring reveals no adverse CO emissions impacts or corridor noise levels. On I–10 & US-290, focus groups held during project planning did not find concerns about social equity among either corridor users or the public at large. The general reaction was that all would benefit if congestion were reduced. Nor have equity concerns been raised during operations. For SR-167, outreach efforts found low-income drivers as or more supportive of the HOT lane as other drivers. HOT Lane conversions have involved Policy and Institutional interaction among multiple agencies. All the HOT lane conversions began with specific policies authorizing initiation and, sometimes, specific directives on cost and revenue matters. On I-15, the regional government responsible for initiation adopted a policy allowing solo drivers to use the HOT lane at variable rates with some revenues going to fund transit in the corridor. New state legislation requires free-flow of HOVs (Level-of-Service C) at all times. Federal environmental justice policy required initial outreach, public involvement across income groups. For I-25/US 36, enabling state legislation allowed project development, with revenues designated for transportation improvements in the corridor. The state assembly also created a new nonprofit business entity within the DOT to finance and operate the facility. The MN legislature created I-394 through legislation allowing a design-build arrangement with the private sector. For I-10/US 290, TXDOT, Houston Metro, the Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration formed a cooperative agreement to start the project. For SR-167, Washington State legislation authorizes the HOT lane and specifies revenues will go to a dedicated multi-modal account. With respect to Monitoring and Evaluation, considerable assessment effort has been devoted to HOT lane conversions, attending to not only traffic impacts, but to issues of revenue, equity and acceptance. Some evaluations go beyond traveler assessments to analyze business and general public responses. For example, the evaluation of I-15 included not only traffic studies but an attitudinal panel and studies of possible changes in air quality, cost of delay, business impacts, bus ridership, land use, park-and-ride lot occupancy, public acceptance, media response, marketing and institutional issues. The evaluation also compared changes in the HOT lane to a control corridor, the I-8 in an attempt to account for outside influences such as changing gas prices. For I-25/US 36, ongoing evaluation focuses on traffic, user reactions, corridor employment and residential impacts. I-394 is evaluating attitudinal, income, traffic, air quality and other effects in a before/after comparison. Detailed user studies are included, as is the case for I-25/US 36 where both current and former users are tracked. SR-167 plans annual studies of traffic, system performance, socio-economics impacts and acceptance. Summary
Pricing Project Category 2: Variable Pricing of New Express LanesNew Expressways share characteristics with two other categories of projects in Section 2. Like HOT Lane Conversions (Category 1) and Pricing on Toll Facilities (Category 3), they use variable pricing to control traffic and reduce peak period congestion and generate new revenues. Also, projects described here may give some preference to HOV travelers. The distinguishing feature of these projects is that instead of applying pricing to existing facilities, congestion pricing is introduced with new road capacity. The overall goal is to increase capacity (thereby reducing congestion) and throughput in the corridor while managing traffic demand through pricing (thereby creating a new high quality travel option for the users). State and local budget cuts and unsuccessful attempts to fund transportation improvements through taxation have increased the interest of states in financing lane additions to existing highways using toll revenues. Newly constructed express lanes with variable tolls have been implemented to date in only one location, on State Route 91 in Orange County, California, but similar strategies are under development in many states. Tolls on the SR-91 added lanes are allowed to vary by time-of-day and congestion and collected without slowing highway speeds using electronic toll collection technology. Tolls could also be set “dynamically”, i.e., they could be increased or decreased every few minutes in response to fluctuating demand so as to ensure that the lanes are fully utilized, yet remain uncongested. ProjectsOrange County, CA. SR-91 Express Lanes opened in December 1995 as a four-lane, 10-mile toll facility in the median of SR-91 – one of the most heavily congested highways in the U.S. and connecting major employment centers of Orange County and southern L.A. County with residential communities of Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. The project added two new lanes in each direction to an existing highway. Toll lanes are separated from the general-purpose lanes by a painted buffer and plastic pylons with no intermediate exits or entrances. Tolls differ by direction and vary by day of the week and time of the day according to a pre-set schedule. Unlike many of the HOT Lane conversions, the toll schedule on SR-91 is not dynamically set to reflect real time congestion, but is set to maintain free flow. The set schedule is updated periodically to reflect trends in traffic condition and maintain free-flowing traffic condition on all toll lanes. As of 2007, the peak toll on the busiest half hour is $9.50, or 95 cents per mile. A "FasTrakTM" transponder is required of all vehicles. Tolls are deducted at full highway speeds from pre-paid accounts via on-board transponders. HOV3+ paid 50% of the regular toll during 2007 peak periods (now free). Initial capital cost was $134 million. Initial operations were under a private developer, California Private Transportation Company (CPTC); in January 2003, the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) purchased the private project for $207.5 million, beginning public operations. The California Highway Patrol (CHP) provides police services at the facility owner’s expense. Maintenance and operational costs also are the responsibility of the owner. Three other new express lane projects under development include San Diego I-15 Managed Lanes, Houston I-10 (Katy) reconstruction and Dallas I-30. The new I-30 serves as a major east/west corridor between Fort Worth and Dallas. The I-30 West Freeway will open an interim HOV lane and transition to tolled express lanes in later phases allowing single-occupant vehicles for a fee and a fee for HOVs up to 50% of the SOV rate. The project will feature two reversible lanes operating during the peak periods. In July 2007, the first six miles of the new HOV lanes opened between Dallas and Fort Worth on I-30. The tollway will utilize existing electronic transponder technology. In San Diego, new “managed lanes” are arising as an extension of I-15 HOT lanes started in 1991. The HOT lanes are being extended to 20 miles in the median of Interstate 15 (I-15). Plans call for four-lanes in the median, moveable barrier, multiple access points, direct access ramps for buses and eventual bus rapid transit (BRT). Pricing will be dynamic, based on level of congestion and distance traveled. On the I-10 “Katy” in Houston, new HOT lanes are under construction (to open in late 2008), with two new lanes in each direction. HOV-3+ users will be provided free access in each peak period, with HOV-2 and SOV travelers charged a variable fee. In addition to the new construction, Houston will add tolling to the other four HOV lanes in the region. Long-range plans call for a network of HOT managed lanes in Houston. FindingsThe effects of new, priced expressways on Traffic and Travel are best documented for SR-91. As of 2004, the use of Express Lanes averaged about 35,000 vehicles per day. The lanes carry well over 40 percent of the total SR-91 traffic during peak periods, with one-third of the total freeway capacity. Initially, the new capacity dramatically reduced traffic and congestion on the general-purpose lanes. Over the years, the traffic has increased on the general purpose lanes and congestion has returned, but the priced Express Lanes continue to be free-flowing even as the daily usage has gone up. Specifically, traffic on priced lanes moves at free-flowing speed of over 60 MPH in contrast to stop and go traffic in general purpose lanes averaging no more than 15 or 20 MPH in peak. Evaluation found a 40% increase in HOV3+ probably due to the free use policy in the first two years. Significantly, charging HOV3+ 50% beginning in 1998 did not change overall HOV use in the corridor. Overall, more SR 91 commuters shifted from single occupant vehicles to high occupancy vehicles than vice versa. There was no significant effect on transit use (1%) in the corridor. Accidents were down after the toll lanes opened, probably due to decreased congestion (accidents on a comparison section of 91 increased). There was no evidence of diversion to/from regional freeways. Use of parallel streets greatly decreased shortly after the 91X lanes opened, but increased in 1998, when freeway congestion returned. Demand on the 91 Express Lanes continues to grow – since opening, total annual vehicle trips have grown 67 percent from 5.7 million trips in 1996 to 9.5 million in 2002. SR-91 shows the Financial and Economic Viability of a privately owned and operated tollway under certain conditions and consequent savings to the public sector and favorable cost/benefit of the project. The four-lane, 10-mile long, toll facility was constructed for approximately $134M with private funds and toll revenues covered construction and operating costs. However, these costs did not involve new right of way, interchange modifications or intermediate access/egress points resulting in a cost of about $3.0 million per lane mile versus $10 million or more per lane mile for typical major urban freeway construction. CPTC corporate reports indicate “acceptable financial performance” when operated as private facility. Income (revenue less expenses) was 733K in 1996 rising to 13.7M in 2001, according to CPTC audits. The State of California saved construction and operating/enforcement costs and Orange County gained property taxes from CPTC of$6.8 million in first 6 years. Another favorable economic finding from SR-91 is the positive benefit/cost picture for the expressway compared to carpool lanes as an alternative. Benefit cost analysis comparing express to duel carpool lanes shows higher net present value for express (490M vs. 303M) largely due to higher travel time savings in spite of higher operating costs. Evaluations of Public and Stakeholder Acceptance of the new expressway cases generally find support, though support is sensitive to private sector involvement. As part of developing a 20-mile “managed lanes” extension of the original I-15 HOT lane project, an assessment of stakeholders and commuters found strong support for the original program and planned expansion. The above referenced telephone survey of facility users found a majority of the respondents expressed approval of the FasTrak program, 92 percent liked a time saving option on I-15 and 84 percent of the respondents favored the managed lanes extension. However, as part of assessing public opinion about expanding the I-15 HOT lanes, researchers found very few knew that some FasTrak revenues supported transit. While SR-91 also found initial public and political support, it diminished with the rise of issues around private operation of the facility. Specifically, controversy arose around a “non-compete clause” in the CPTC-Caltrans agreement preventing adding lanes or building mass transit along the nearby Riverside Freeway to ensure profit for the express lanes. Under the non-compete provision, CPTC sued Caltrans over its widening at the interchange with the Eastern Transportation Corridor. The suits were dismissed only upon OCTA purchase of the facility. Two unsuccessful state bills (AB 1091, AB 1346) sought to void the non-compete clause and have the public sector acquire the lanes by condemnation. Media coverage portrayed CPTC as a “monopoly” with a 35-year operations contract. As the controversy continued, commuter group approval of private companies operating toll roads decreased to 30-45% between 1996 and 1999, compared to 50-75% approval in 1996. However in spite of this finding, commuters approved (in the 45-75% range) of HOT lanes in concept, if lanes don’t become congested. The SR-91, Dallas I-30 and the San Diego I-15 extension projects paid attention to potential issues of Equity, with generally favorable results where specific assessments were made. In the case of I-30, equity analysis and surveys will be included in all future environmental documents for the entire network of priced facilities. The initial findings and results have not indicated any adverse impacts, but will be regularly monitored and updated. In the case of I-30, a detailed equity analysis will be performed as part of the environmental assessment. In the case of SR-91, evaluation found a “moderate” income effect, with the percent of trips on the express lanes for the lowest and highest incomes (20% and 50%) staying the same over the survey period. Evaluation also found use of the express lanes increasing over time for all modes across all incomes. In the case of the planned expansion of I-15 into longer and improved “managed lanes,” a telephone survey of facility users found 71% consider the extension fair to regular lane users (71%) and managed lane users (75%). There were very few differences in attitudes about the fairness of the lanes based on ethnicity or income. However, half of respondents said tolling of SOV drivers was unfair double taxation (FasTrak customers less so than other corridor users). SR-91, Dallas I-30 and Houston’s planned HOT lane network suggest the importance of detailed Public Policy and agreements in support of new expressways development. SR-91 was set up as a private for-profit investment, one of four private-public partnership authorized by the California Legislature under the AB 680 legislation enacted in 1989. AB 680 provides up to a 35-year lease of right-of-way and airspace, which then reverts to the State. Law requires the facility must be built to State standards, meet applicable laws and environmental standards, and any State services must be fully compensated. Importantly, the initial franchise agreement with Caltrans included "non-compete" provision to limit nearby corridor improvements. And because several toll facilities were anticipated or developing at the time, state law (Title 21) required transponders to be useable on all state toll facilities. In the case of I-30, project development was supported by state and regional policy requiring that any planned new highway capacity must be evaluated for potential toll/managed lane applications, including value pricing. For the Houston planned HOT network, TXDOT, Houston Metro, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Transit Administration and Harris County Toll Road Authority will negotiate specific cooperative agreements to implement the network. Both SR-91 and Houston I-10 “managed lanes” reconstruction project emphasize thorough ongoing Evaluation, and SR-91 shows the importance of multiple approaches and control corridor information for robust results. I-10 has established baseline data on traffic, accidents, travel time and other indicators to monitor performance into the future as pricing gets underway. As evaluators of SR-91, Cal-Poly State University carried out two phases of evaluations including direct observations, surveys of corridor users, and impact modeling. Telephone surveys included present and former commuters; residents from surrounding areas in proportion to the geographic distribution of SR 91 commuters; a panel of travelers surveyed over time; drivers identified by license plate observations and transponder use; and commuters participating in U.C. Irvine research. These multiple evaluation data sources indicating similar findings added confidence to conclusions. While there was no formal control corridor, evaluators did reference a non-tolled comparison section of SR-91, adjoining general-purpose lanes and nearby freeway corridors (SR 60 and SR 57) to help rule out effects of gas prices and other outside influences. Another evaluation finding of note is, at the time, EMFAC emission modeling could not account for the local effects of accelerations and decelerations, using factors derived from average free flow speeds. The result was an inaccurate prediction of the more congested periods showing lowest emissions. Summary
Evaluations were carried out for most projects, though air quality assessments were lacking. Evaluations have focused on traffic, travel time, accidents, user profiles (in part for equity assessments), user opinions and, in one case, opinions of corridor residents. Both of the most well documented projects compared results to non-tolled sections of the highway or nearby freeways to account for possible outside influences. Only one case attempted a detailed air quality assessment and found models unable to cope well with effects of acceleration and decelerations. Pricing Project Category 3: Variable Pricing on Existing Toll FacilitiesThis category of pricing introduces variable tolls on highway facilities with fixed tolls. As with other pricing strategies highlighted in this section, the purpose is to introduce prices varying by day-of-the-week and time-of-day to reduce congestion. The variable prices are intended to encourage some travelers to use the roadway facility during less congested periods, to shift to another mode of transportation, or to change route. Toll agencies have also used the availability of off-peak toll discounts to encourage the use of electronic tolling. ProjectToll Authorities introduced variable tolls to reduce peak period congestion and to gain more efficient use of facilities, to delay capacity enhancements or to raise revenues for facility improvements (often by using off-peak toll discounts to make an overall toll increase program more acceptable). For the Cape Coral Bridge and Midpoint Memorial Bridge in Lee County, Florida, the explicit intent of the program was to spread traffic from peak to shoulder times and thereby postpone expensive bridge enhancements to accommodate growing peak traffic. In Illinois, the Tollway had not increased tolls since 1983 and wanted revenues for widening, rehabilitation and extension. The Tollway also was interested in boosting electronic toll payment for possible cost savings and revenue gains. In New Jersey, the variable pricing was intended primarily to gain better use of capacity rather than revenue increases, though preserving specific revenue levels was an important consideration. In the case of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), the toll changes on Hudson River Bridges/Tunnels were aimed at better use of the facility by spreading peak congestion, but also were planned to meet specific revenue needs underlying the capital investment program. On the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the alternatives examined in the feasibility study were designed to improve use by spreading peak traffic, gain potential benefits of electronic toll collection and meet forecast revenue needs. In August 1998, Lee County, Florida implemented value pricing on two toll bridges between the cities of Ft. Myers and Cape Coral, the Cape Coral Bridge and Midpoint Memorial Bridge. These bridges experience heavy use by commuters, with average daily traffic varying between 60,000 and 65,000 vehicles at the time of program initiation. The initial Lee County pricing strategy provided bridge users with a 50 percent toll discount during selected “shoulder-of-the-peak” periods before and after the peak-of-the-peak. To be eligible for the toll discounts users must pay tolls electronically. The shoulder period toll discount was extended to vehicles with 3-or-more axles in 2003. In November 2007, the toll structure was changed to a one-way toll (for a one-year trial period), with tolls for two-axle vehicles doubled but collected only in the westbound direction. The future of toll levels and the discount program is currently being discussed in Lee County. The 148-mile New Jersey Turnpike is one of the most heavily traveled roadways in the country with average daily trips exceeding 500,000 vehicles. The Turnpike Authority introduced time-of-day tolls in 2000. Weekday peak-period users were charged a higher toll while the rate for off-peak users remained the same as it had been since 1991. To be eligible for the off-peak toll discount, users had to pay electronically with E-ZPass. The toll discount was a 7 percent reduction for E-ZPass users, and a 16 percent reduction for switching from paying cash tolls in the peak to using E-ZPass and traveling in the off-peak hours (reductions based on traveling the entire length of the Turnpike). In 2003, the general toll level was increased again, with time-of-day toll discounts maintained. The off-peak discount was 11 percent for E‑ZPass users, while the difference between the cash toll and the off-peak discounted toll was 25 percent. In 2006, toll discounts for peak EZ-Pass users were eliminated, but the off-peak toll discounts were continued, creating a 25 percent discount for all users shifting travel to the off-peak period. In 2001, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) Board of Commissioners approved a variable toll program at the two tunnels and four bridges connecting New York and New Jersey. These crossings were very heavily used, with average daily eastbound traffic totaling over 127 million vehicles in 2006. Off-peak tolls were raised less than peak tolls (passenger cars using E-ZPass receive a $1 discount from the peak fee -17 percent). Passenger cars switching from cash to E-ZPass and traveling in the off-peak received a $2 (33 percent) discount from the peak fee. Trucks receive a $1 discount per axle (17 percent) for traveling in the off-peak hours, or a $2.50 discount (42 percent) for traveling during weekday overnight hours. (The latest tolls doubled the dollar discount to $2 between peak and off-peak hours by eliminating E-ZPass peak period discounts. Now, cash and E-Zpass pay $8 peak rate, but E-ZPass holders pay $6 off-peak). The Illinois Tollway, which operates 274 miles of toll roads in northern Illinois, implemented a new toll structure in 2005. Tolls were raised for cars and trucks, with tolls for cash-paying cars doubling (from $0.40 to $0.80 on a typical toll plaza), while tolls for cars using electronic payment were not increased. Congestion pricing was implemented for small, medium and large trucks. Peak-period toll rates for cash-paying small, medium and large trucks were increased substantially (from $0.50 to $1.50 for 2-axle trucks, from a range of $0.75-$1.00 to $2.25 for 3&4 axle trucks, and from a range of $1.25-$1.50 to $4.00 for trucks with 5+ axles). Trucks using electronic payment (I-Pass) were offered discounts of $0.50 (small and medium trucks) and $1.00 (large trucks) for traveling during the daytime off-peak hours. These discounted rates also apply 10pm-6am. In a study commencing in 2002, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission examined several congestion pricing scenarios for urban interchanges in the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh metro areas, but did not implement variable pricing. The study examined combinations of off-peak discounts (by time-of-day and areas covered), discount methods (fixed or variable), vehicle covered and toll differentials for cash and electronic payment users. The alternatives were designed to shift traffic out of congested periods, encourage use of electronic tolling, promote safe and efficient traffic movement, and enhance revenue growth. At the same time the study was undertaken, electronic tolling (E‑ZPass) was implemented for travel between ticket interchanges on the Turnpike mainline. FindingsA range of travel behavior changes and congestion reductions resulted from introducing variable tolling on existing toll facilities. Simultaneous introduction of electronic tolling and time-of-day pricing sometimes made it difficult to isolate the effects of variable pricing, however, some programs interviewed users to supplement traffic data as a way to sort out the cause of behavior changes. Overall, it seems variable pricing has had the desired Traffic Impacts. In Lee County, Florida, roughly 38 percent of drivers eligible for toll discounts (using transponders to pay tolls) indicated in interviews that variable pricing caused them to alter travel behavior. A survey taken the year after the toll discount program went into effect showed that 71 per cent of eligible drivers shifted their time of travel at least once a week to take advantage of the $0.25 off-peak toll discount available to customers paying an annual fee. Overall, evaluators concluded the program succeeded in making better use of existing capacity, thereby postponing the need for additions to capacity. The PANYNJ variable toll program also showed significant peak to off-peak traffic shifts for both autos and trucks, with resulting travel time savings and an earlier end to the morning peak by as much as 20 minutes at certain crossings. As with the New Jersey Turnpike, all of this change cannot be attributed solely to variable tolling, since some of the change resulted from reductions in waiting times at toll plazas due to increased E-ZPass adoption. On the Illinois Tollway in 2005, a 200 percent increase in tolls in conjunction with off-peak discounts for trucks resulted in a 7.7 percent reduction in peak period truck traffic. The impact on passenger car traffic appears to be small probably because tolls did not go up for cars paying with I-Pass, which constitute a very large proportion of car traffic. Interviews with truckers using the Illinois Tollway suggest that potential for shifting commercial vehicle traffic out of the peak may be limited. Inflexibility of delivery times and ability to pass costs on to customers were cited as reasons by larger truckers. Analysts believe that the decrease in peak period truck traffic that did occur at some toll plazas likely came from smaller independent truckers who did not have the ability to pass costs along. Tollway authorities felt that any shift out of the peak, even if small, was a positive outcome, as was introducing the concept of time-of-day toll differentials. Several study scenarios tested for the Pennsylvania Turnpike study showed some reduction in peak-period traffic. Non-commuters were more likely to respond positively, but many focus group participants indicated they were already exercising travel time flexibility to the maximum extent possible. Trucker surveys indicated that peak/off-peak toll differentials would have to be large to lead to altered travel times. Between 15 and 35 percent of trucking companies indicated they would shift traffic to take advantage of off-peak discounts. Based on these results, the Turnpike Authority decided not to adopt variable tolling. Outreach campaigns, stakeholder involvement and media relations were all important to initiating and sustaining acceptable programs, or deciding not to proceed. Lee County established three citizen advisory committees consisting of local bridge users and businesses. Citizen focus groups objected to automated debiting of checking or credit card accounts. Increased peak tolls were seen as penalizing those with inflexible schedules, but off-peak discounts proved acceptable. Once the off-peak discount was underway planners were attentive to concerns, marketing included radio and print media advertisements, advertising billboards, point-of-sale displays, newsletters, press releases and media kits, presentations to community groups and employers. In Illinois, planners carried out twenty three interviews with trucking operators and found mixed reactions to variable pricing, but favorable reaction to electronic tolling. Tollway planners also met with civic groups and editorial boards to convey that congestion relief would be forthcoming if enough drivers switched to electronic payment. In the case of the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, the Executive Director served as a strong and active advocate of the pricing program. Strong support of several environmental and transit advocate groups served to counterbalance initial opposition from truckers and the Automobile Club. In the case of PANYNJ, building internal advocates for the pricing plan was an important first step, aided by analysis showing necessary revenue targets could be hit with variable pricing. PANYNJ initiated campaigns focused in part on large employers and encouraged flextime as a way to adjust to the tolls. Opposition still arose at public hearings, though more around the general toll increase than peak pricing. While sufficient support allowed the program to go forth, stakeholder surveys after the program started revealed opposition and proponents largely held to the same views as before the program started, underscoring the continuous nature of gaining and holding the balance of acceptance. In the case of Pennsylvania, stakeholders included those with PADOT, the Turnpike Commissioners, Transportation Management Association, and the City of New York. The results of these interviews suggested considerable opposition, especially among those most knowledgeable about the proposal. Consequently, the decision was made not to proceed. Equity issues generally were not critical to devising acceptable and ongoing programs, except in one case; and, equity evaluations show mixed or scanty results. In Florida, peak toll proposals were rejected largely due to a promise by the County Commission that tolls would not be raised again after a 1994 toll increase, leading instead to a program of reduced off-peak tolls. However, income equity was not an issue in planning or evaluation focus groups and surveys. In Illinois, a study of changes in I-Pass ownership concluded there was a “boost in I-PASS ownership rates across all income groups.” However, in terms of absolute proportions of I-Pass users, income is a major determinant. The study indicated, “… high income ZIP Codes (median income among working households above $80,000) have more than twice as high a share of likely Tollway drivers as low-income ZIP Codes (less than $60,000).” Again, however, income equity did not derail program continuation. In New Jersey, breakdowns of users by income were not reliable because of small samples. PANYNJ did not uncover major equity issues in planning or evaluate equity effects after program implementation. Data from evaluation studies suggested that 58% of those traveling into Manhattan during peak periods who faced price increases had relatively high annual household incomes above $75,000. No equity analysis was conducted for the Pennsylvania study. Environmental impacts were rarely evaluated in depth, though some positive and a few negative impacts were found. In Florida, variable pricing program had no significant impact on vehicle speeds, queue lengths at toll plazas, average vehicle occupancy, transit ridership, or accidents. Thus, evaluators conclude there was no significant environmental impact. Likewise, the heavy vehicle program was estimated to have no significant effect on environmental quality, since vehicles with 3 or more axles represent less than one percent of total bridge traffic at each toll facility. In Illinois, no environmental assessments were made. In New Jersey, after the introduction of variable pricing and E-ZPass, vehicle emissions at toll plazas declined. Evaluators conclude probably electronic payment was more responsible than pricing for the result. An important cautionary finding is emissions rose again after the initial decline as overall traffic levels increased. Neither PANYNJ nor Pennsylvania assessed air quality impacts. Barring one example of toll discount without any peak-period toll increases (Florida), the cost/revenue picture has been quite favorable. Because these facilities already have much of the pricing infrastructure already in place, revenues have exceeded costs. Furthermore, pricing has also delayed the need for costly capital improvements. In Florida, the off-peak discount program did not generate positive cash flow, but probably did succeed in postponing by years the need for expensive bridge capacity enhancements. In Illinois, revenue impacts are not documented, though models predicted a 50% revenue increase from electronic payment, varying toll schedules and the doubling of tolls for cash paying passenger cars (electronic payment unchanged). In New Jersey, the combination of higher peak tolls and off-peak toll discounts met revenue targets. For PANYNJ, variable pricing was set with revenue targets firmly in mind, and the targets are likely to have been met. No cost-revenue findings are available in the Pennsylvania study. Evaluation methods usually involved before/after comparisons of traffic and user data, usually not with control facilities. In Florida, before/after data were tested for statistical differences. Variables included traffic volume counts, speed measurements, toll plaza queue lengths, travel times, bridge user surveys and random telephone surveys of bridge users. Focus groups also were employed. In Illinois, evaluators used before/after transaction data from the first 6 months of 2005 compared to the same six months in 2004 before toll change. The last six months of 2005 data was not used because construction and substantial gas price changes would cloud findings. Surveys were carried out with trucking companies assessing changes in tolls paid and reactions to toll increase. In New Jersey, assessment included traffic and emissions (using a microscopic traffic simulation model of the Turnpike), travel behavior, economic value of travel time savings, demand elasticity, and media/decision maker reactions. Evaluators cautioned simultaneous introduction of variable pricing and E-ZPass toll technology made it difficult to sort out their respective influences. Small numbers of passenger survey responses made it difficult to draw solid conclusions about demographics or behavioral choices. For PANYNJ, evaluation focused on before/after behavior, traffic and transit volumes, and public reactions. Focus groups with auto drivers and truckers were included. To avoid using traffic data affected by the impacts of 9/11/2001 and various operational restrictions placed at PANYNJ facilities after 9/11, the analyses focused on the time from April-August 2001 for the period after the new toll schedule went into effect. For the Pennsylvania study, a logit model was developed based on stated preference surveys used to determine the shift potential from variable pricing. Technology changes often were linked to the introduction of variable pricing, making pricing transactions as easy as possible. In Florida, Lee County switched from the use of optical scanning labels to a transponder (LeeWay) system with prepaid toll accounts. As of February 2005, heavy vehicles (vehicles with 3‑or‑more axles) were required to use the attended lanes on all bridges to check the number of axles when the toll transaction was processed. However, axle counting and vehicle separation equipment is being installed at the Midpoint Bridge that would allow these vehicles to use electronic tolling lanes. The Cape Coral Bridge also is scheduled for new axle counting and vehicle separation equipment. In Illinois, pricing is via vehicle-mounted transponder with the toll deducted from a pre-paid account; some windshields and cars with GPS require an exterior transponder. In Illinois, the goal is to convert all facilities from a traditional barrier system to an end-to-end open road automated tolling system allowing payments at highway speeds. In New Jersey, the E-Z Pass toll technology enabled implementation of the variable pricing program. The PANYNJ and the NJ Turnpike charge tolls for commercial vehicles via electronic toll collection both via treadle equipment in traditional toll lanes and in highway-speed open-road tolling through road loops and advanced vehicle classification software. Summary
Pricing Project Category 4: Regionwide Pricing InitiativesThis project category encompasses pricing at several potential locations within a region, including new or existing lanes or other facilities and, in some cases, including region wide initiatives to promote carpooling or improve transit services. All are feasibility studies potentially leading to implementation. The purpose of the studies is to determine the most effective and feasible location for pricing or the feasibility and effectiveness of several pricing programs implemented at once or in sequence. The overall purpose is to add highway capacity to a region while managing new traffic levels and generating revenues through pricing. The lane management is aimed at creating new high quality travel options for the users where the toll revenues can cover all or a significant proportion of the associated costs. ProjectsAn 18-month study of region wide pricing applications was initiated by the Maryland Department of Transportation in 1999. The study objective was to determine the feasibility of a broad range of variable pricing strategies in Maryland and to develop recommendations for possible implementation. The initial study examined potential pilot projects in several locations and was followed in 2002 and 2004 by HOT lane options for I-270, I-495, I-695, and I-95 north of Baltimore. In 2005, an agreement was signed for new express toll lanes on I-95/JFK Expressway in Baltimore (expected to be complete by 2011). Study is underway to possibly extend these express lanes another 10 miles. In 2007, a study examined managed lanes on I-270 and I-495, possibly connecting a planned new Inter-County Connector (ICC) in Prince Georges/Montgomery Counties with planned I-495 HOT lanes in Virginia. The ICC project, already under construction, will be an 18-mile, controlled access tolled highway built to link existing and proposed activity centers in the I-270 and I-95/US 1 corridors. In early 2008, Minnesota is launching a feasibility study to explore the potential for implementing a “FAST Miles” program in the Twin Cities area. Participating motorists would receive credits each month to pay tolls on priced lanes. Once credits are exhausted, the motorist would pay the full toll. If credits are not used for tolls, they can count against vehicle registration fees, property taxes and possibly other fees and costs. The purpose is to encourage saving credits by carpooling or using public transportation, thus reducing highway congestion. The National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board road pricing study was launched in 2005 to examine the feasibility of a region wide network of value priced lanes. Scenarios examined include combinations of: (1) adding two new toll lanes in each direction on every freeway in the region, with one new toll lane in each direction to major arterials outside the Capital Beltway; (2) tolling all DC river crossings and tolling all freeway lanes in the District; (3) tolling parkways in the region. Other scenarios remove priced lanes based on lack of demand and enhanced transit. Analysis includes demand, revenue, costs, viability of transit operations, land use impacts, equity impacts and other elements. The scope includes HOT lanes along 15 miles of the Capital Beltway in Virginia, six new priced lanes along the new Inter-County Connector in Maryland, and HOV lanes converted to HOT lanes on the I-95/395 corridor in Northern Virginia. FindingsIn Maryland, the project team has examined travel demand forecasts, pricing strategies, toll collection technologies, enforcement options, equity concerns, legal issues, infrastructure requirements, and lane separation options. Public outreach has included project brochures, websites, public meetings, hearings, open house workshops and local advisory groups. Public reaction to early studies of HOT lanes was negative and important to revising work scopes in subsequent studies. Equity concerns have been a major point of emphasis. Preliminary engineering work, cost estimating, and preliminary assessment of environmental impacts is underway. No cost or projected impact information is yet available. Regarding technology, the HOT lane projects on I‑270 in Montgomery County and HOV lanes along US 50 in Prince Georges County may use monthly “hang tags” as passes for entry into existing HOV lanes, similar to the early version of I-15 in San Diego. The State Highway Administration expects to receive and review the draft feasibility report in early 2008. The first segment of the ICC project is expected to be under construction in early 2008, with all segments projected to be open to traffic by 2012. In Minnesota, proposals will be solicited in early 2008 from private sector and academic partners to begin the outreach and implementation of the FAST miles project. Tasks will include establishing a panel of pricing experts and local officials to examine expected benefits and potential barriers to project implementation. A Task Force of national, state and local officials (including Vehicle Infrastructure Integration program representatives) will also be assembled to help guide the project. At this stage, there are no available findings on equity, costs/revenues, traffic or environmental impacts or planned evaluation and monitoring. In the National Capital Region, an important preliminary finding suggests the cost revenue picture of variable priced lanes very much depends on the specific combination of new and existing facilities. A comparison of the forecasted revenues versus costs for each of the study scenarios found the high costs of building new interchanges and lanes were critical. Applying variable pricing to existing HOV or general purpose lanes generated revenues significantly in excess of costs. However, where new lanes are built, all depends on level of demand and size of capital costs. For some segments, revenues will not offset capital and operating costs. Impact projections are generally favorable. Initial analysis of HOT lanes on the Beltway and I-95/395 show an increase in transit use, some decrease in HOV, slight increase in VMT and some increase in speeds on mixed use lanes. One key finding is a network of variable priced lanes will have more effect than the simple sum of individual projects. Equity and environmental effects are still being assessed. One metric used to account for impacts across ethnic and income groups is the proportion of jobs within 45 minutes by auto compared to the general population. Planners are calculating this metric under various pricing scenarios relative to not implementing pricing. The extensive regional analysis and multiple scenarios demands considerable modeling effort: The model incorporating region wide jobs and households has over 2000 zones and includes tens of thousands of highway and transit links. Each model run takes approximately 16 hours of computer processor time. The TPB project team has also begun evaluation of enhanced transit service on the priced network and is assessing potential land use effects. A project phasing plan has been developed, including value-priced networks for 2010 and 2020. Summary
Pricing Project Category 5: Making Driver Costs VariableThe projects in this category convert some of the fixed costs of owing and operating a car to variable costs or introducing greater variability to existing variable charges. As with other pricing approaches in this section, the purpose is to set travel prices in a way to reduce driving especially at congested times and places. Such variable charges are also seen as revenue generating mechanisms that could fully or partially replace existing road user taxes in the future. Projects included here demonstrate consumer responses to:
The projects have evaluated driver responses in experimental groups rather than developed ongoing, fully operational programs. The four projects described here examine the effects particular variable road use pricing strategies on travel behavior and seek insights into some of the institutional and technological challenges facing large scale implementation of these concepts. ProjectsThe Oregon Department of Transportation introduced the Road User Fee Program pilot to assess the technical feasibility of replacing the state gas tax with mileage fees, as well as the potential of using variable fees in congested areas at peak travel times to influence traffic levels. The Puget Sound Regional Council’s Traffic Choice Study tested the practicality and travel implications of charging tolls based on distance, time of day, and road location. The Minnesota Department of Transportation’s Mileage-based User Fee (Pay-as-You-Drive) demonstration project evaluated impact on travel of charging auto lease costs or insurance premiums by the mile. The Atlanta program is initially testing the user response to mileage based insurance charges across test households, and later will evaluate varying the fee further by congested times and places. The projects share certain goals, though emphasis varies. The Oregon program, while interested in driver behavior, also emphasized the potential of user fees to generate revenues and possibly replace the gas tax as the principal source of highway funding. The state also was interested in varying the fee to reduce congestion. The Puget Sound program emphasized the test of area wide congestion pricing for congestion relief focusing on the travel behavioral impacts of prices varying by time, place and distance. The Minnesota project aimed at better understanding the sensitivity of drivers to alterations in vehicle ownership/lease costs, and how results varied by income, location, and annual mileage driven. Planners also wanted to gauge the potential of user-based fees to reduce travel, acceptance of user-based fees, and ways to develop new user fee policies and requisite institutional arrangements for eventual wide scale implementation. The Atlanta program initially focused on the travel effects of a mileage based insurance fee, but the purpose grew to influencing not only total daily trips and mode choice, but shifting travel out of congested periods. There were similarities among the organizational and experimental aspects of the projects. All established mileage budgets based on baseline driving records. Mileage-based charges were debited from these budgets and any balance was paid to study participants, though participants were not at risk of losing their own money if they exceeded their budget. All studies involved relatively small sample sizes and were conducted in metropolitan areas. Cooperating gas stations in the area and participant vehicles were equipped with hardware needed to charge fees based on mileage. In the case of Atlanta, baseline information and some preliminary pricing response data has been collected, with plans underway to implement congestion pricing in similar fashion to the above three projects. Households shifting travel out of congested periods will retain a significant portion of their budget accounts. Oregon5-month experimental field test included 299 motorists and two service stations in the Portland area. Three experimental groups participated in the pilot: (1) a “control” group in which technology was tested but no charge made; (2) a fixed-fee group of 95 vehicles subject to a flat mileage fee, and; (3) a variable-fee “rush-hour” group of 102 vehicles that paid mileage fees based on place and time of travel. On-board equipment kept track of miles driven inside and outside of zones and the calculated mileage fee was reported at the gas pump. The Oregon study sized the mileage fees to simulate a direct replacement for the motor fuel tax – $0.012 per mile. It also discounted fees to $0.0043 during non-peak hours in certain zones and adjusted upwards to $0.10 for peak travel in congested zones and times. The Puget Soundexperimental field test ran for eight months, involved 257 households and over 400 participants. Drivers were made aware of pricing levels on certain roads both though system maps and with real-time displays on an in-vehicle meter. Mileage fees varied based on freeway versus non-freeway use and time of travel on all major roads in the region. Weekday toll rates for freeways were $0.40 in morning peak periods, $0.50 in evening peak and between $0.10 and $0.15 in between. Weekday toll rates for non-freeways were $0.20 in morning peak periods and $0.25 in evening peak periods, and ranged between $0.05 and $0.075 in between. Weekend travel was priced differently. The Minnesota experiment included 130 participants whose travel behavior was measured under priced and non-priced conditions in a longitudinal study. Minnesota’s pricing replicated the mileage component of vehicle leases or insurance policies, and ranged from $0.05 to $0.25 per mile. Some of the experimental groups had peak versus off-peak pricing, but pricing was not dependent on location. For Atlanta, research is monitoring one year of baseline travel for 285 participating households. Approximately 500 vehicles are equipped with instruments to track vehicle speed and position for every trip. Travel diaries and employer commute options surveys are being collected from participants and their employers, and the same for controls. Participating drivers have an LCD panel displaying the price of each trip made. So far, about 100 households have begun to participate with initial analysis focusing on responses to changing gas prices and cent-per-mile incentives. A 20 cents per mile congestion surcharge will be assessed to commute trips undertaken under congested freeway conditions (speeds < 40 mph). FindingsAll evaluated programs found evidence that drivers respond to mileage-based and congestion pricing by reducing travel. Oregon VMT fee project found the fixed-fee group increased average peak miles per day by 11 percent and reduced average off-peak miles per day by 12 percent. The rush hour group decreased average peak mileage by 16 percent and reduced average off-peak mileage by 14 percent. In contrast, the control group increased peak period mileage by 17 percent and reduced off-peak mileage by 6 percent. The Puget Sound congestion pricing project compared travel patterns among participants before and after the program, not to patterns of a control group as in Oregon. Findings indicated an approximately 10 percent (4% AM, 11% PM) reduction in vehicle use during peak travel times, with considerably greater traffic reduction on specific roadways. Minnesota compared participant travel before and after the program. The evaluation found an 8.1 percent decline in weekend average daily mileage per vehicle for participants between un-priced and priced travel. Average daily mileage fell 6.6 percent during weekday peak-periods. In all other comparison cases, the average mileage during priced periods was lower than for un-priced periods. Drivers already with leased vehicles and vehicles not subject to the variable pricing were more likely to change behavior than those not under these circumstances. While the overall averages in daily mileage followed the noted trends, breakdowns by price levels showed some inconsistencies. Some of those facing the highest prices increased daily mileage, though the result may be attributable to small sample sizes. Some of the evaluations addressed mode changes and changes to unpriced vehicles. In Oregon, 14 percent of households in the rush-hour group reported that a household member began using public transit to save money. Twelve percent of households in the flat-fee group reported mode changes to transit. Measurable impacts of Puget Sound study indicated nearly 80 percent of households drove less and/or shifted travel modes. Minnesota found that if one or more unpriced vehicles are available within a household, some driving may shift to the unpriced vehicle(s). Reliability of technology became an issue in one program, and several gave strong attention to privacy matters. In Oregon, there were technological problems reported with communication between the fueling stations and the on-vehicle device transmitting mileage to the service station computers. Service station owners reported integrating with existing computer systems and equipment installation were a burden, but reported no change in business costs or fueling operations. The Puget Sound study applied simpler technology and reported no significant issues. Both studies concluded that the technology to implement large-scale mileage pricing programs was available and could be readily employed by states. The Minnesota study was not intended to test GPS or area-based technology, and instead used the most readily available off-the-shelf equipment that met the study needs. To satisfy privacy concerns, in Oregon project, no vehicle location or trip data was stored. The only centrally stored data were vehicle identification numbers, zone mileage totals for each vehicle, and the amount of fuel purchased. In Puget Sound, privacy was addressed by balancing the specificity of data remaining with the vehicle (for auditing and in disputes) against data transmitted to gas station or program computers. The GPS system deployed collected detailed information on not only miles driven, but exact vehicle location. Minnesota also addressed privacy by consideration of where key information resides. The program used a removable data recorder plugged into the vehicle’s OBD II port that recorded trip data, mileage, and time of travel and could be retrieved by researchers. Participant reactions to the pilot programs demonstrate favorable reactions are possible with experience and also point to key determinants of driver opinions. Oregon found participant concerns at the outset included possible damage to vehicles from equipment installation, lack of knowledge about the mileage fee system, mistrust of the technology, and doubts about its utility and security. However, after the pilot, 91 percent of participants said they would be willing to keep the on-vehicle equipment and pay the mileage fee rather than the gas tax if the system were extended statewide. In Minnesota, participants in the experiment group were more likely than the control group to consider pay-as-you-drive insurance and leasing with variable mileage pricing by time of day and yearly audits, again pointing to the role of experience in forming opinion. Minnesota findings also suggest the importance of flexibility: the majority of the participants said that they were more likely to choose pay-as-you-drive insurance if they could switch to traditional insurance without penalty. Finally, Minnesota results suggest drivers may prefer variable insurance to variable leasing. A survey of 410 drivers in the Minneapolis St. Paul area found 25 percent of respondents probably or definitely interested in mileage-based insurance compared to 16 percent of respondents expressing the same interest level in mileage-based leasing. Summary
Pricing Project Category 6: Other Selected Pricing ProjectsTwo additional pricing projects are selected for inclusions in this Section. As with projects described under Project Category 5: Making Driver Costs Variable, the two projects described here make explicit certain auto use costs normally obscured from motorists with the goal of reducing auto use. Car sharing charges an hourly rate for short-term car rental. Parking cash out enables employees to know the cost of parking often hidden in employer leases with building owners, and provides the employee the option of taking cash instead of parking. The goal is to encourage automobile users to reduce their travel by: making them more fully aware of the actual cost of riving and/or parking; and enabling them to reduce the number of vehicles owned. The first large car sharing programs in the U.S. began in1998. Programs now exist in at least 15 metropolitan areas. Impacts and operations of these programs have been examined in the literature, including a comprehensive Transportation Cooperative Research Program publication (Car Sharing: Where and How It Succeeds, TCRP Report 108, Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C., 2005). Likewise, parking cash out has been implemented at several employer sites in the U.S. beginning in 1997. Impacts were assessed early on by Donald Shoup. An updated description of the concept and listing of relevant studies can be found at the TDM Encyclopedia website sponsored by the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (http://www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm8.htm). The reader is encouraged to examine these resources to complement the findings and conclusions provided here. ProjectsCar Sharing:This strategy involves hourly neighborhood car rentals. By sharing a neighborhood car, individuals can eliminate fixed expenses of ownership and insurance costs, and instead incur a variable payment based on usage. This results in an increase in the perceived costs of driving. This type of pricing provides an incentive for auto users to reduce vehicle miles in order to realize cost savings. People who drive very little and/or live in very dense urban areas may lower costs by not owning a vehicle by allowing these individuals the option of selling their vehicle (in some cases an older, inefficient, polluting vehicle) and participating in the car share program instead. Customers may use the program in place of a car, reducing the costs associated with vehicle ownership. Launched in 2001, non-profit City Car Share in San Francisco operates a car share program reaching 4,000 drivers with reported revenues of about $2 million in 2003. Under the authority of San Francisco County Transportation Authority (SFCTA) and formed in cooperation with Berkeley and Oakland and with support from public interest trusts and coalitions, it offered 90 short term rental vehicles available in more than 40 locations in San Francisco and east bay. It makes agreements with transit, businesses and building owners, insuring car/driver and managing reservations. The attraction of car share is it is cheaper than taxis or rental cars for most trips, with membership dues that were set at the start of the program at: $10/month; then $5/hour and 40¢/mile for most cars (application fee was $30 with a refundable security deposit of $300). The program operates in the same service area as two for profit companies. Parking Cash Out:Parking Cash Out strategy works by allowing employees to give up their free or subsidized parking in exchange for an equivalent monthly cash amount that they can use for any purpose they choose. The rationale behind this strategy is that those who were receiving subsidized or free parking now face market rates for parking and have the option of avoiding paying for parking if they choose to shift to other commuting options. Those who shift eliminate SOV trips and reduce traffic and related problems. Evidence from past studies of cash out suggests employees accepting cash instead of parking may well opt for more use of auto alternatives while pocketing some of the cash allowance. Ideally, employers then can negotiate with parking/building managers to pay for fewer monthly parking spaces. King County Metro in 2001 began promotion of parking cash-out to downtown Seattle employers. King County offered employers both a financial incentive and technical support in administering cash out: $125 a month per employee receiving free parking prior to program implementation; after 9 months, the offer was an additional $125 per employee relinquishing free parking space. No public policy changes were needed to implement the program, though a trip reduction law in the project area allowed for good access to employers. County staff marketed to these employers, presented at meetings in downtown Seattle, distributed brochures at transportation fairs and worked through the Downtown Seattle Association. FindingsThe assessment of the San Francisco car share program showed mixed results and the need for continued, well structured evaluation. After two years of operation of the San Francisco program, a third of participants reduced their car ownership by at least one car, and two-thirds reported that they had opted not to purchase another car because of the program. In a matched pair comparison with non-members, it was estimated that members drove 6.46 miles less per day than non-members. While this program also enabled some prior transit users to make new automobile trips, the overall net impact seemed to have been to reduce vehicle miles of travel among the members. Further, the observed trend of reduction in auto ownership among members appeared to promise future reduction in vehicle miles. The latest evaluation report (2006) shows a large proportion of car share trips are made off-peak, possibly moderating congestion. There is evidence of some curtailing of adding vehicles to households (carshare compared to control group), but reductions in vehicles already owned show no consistent result (again, carshare compared to controls). Overall VMT declines were cited by evaluators, but were not statistically significant without certain assumptions and adjustments for mode and occupancy. A complication in evaluation was the difficulty of creating comparable controls, as these were made up of applicants who initially registered but did not join, meaning they may not have been fully comparable to joiners. Overall, the SF carshare experience suggests possible reductions in congestion, car ownership and overall VMT. Clearly, continued and careful evaluation is vital. Results of the Seattle parking cash out promotions are unclear due to minimal participation. For example, while the downtown businesses association made 744 sales calls, only three employers agreed to a presentation, and none elected to participate in the program. Eventually, all efforts resulted in three businesses and 18 employees participating. Minimal acceptance probably was due to parking subsidies already eliminated for most employees; an extensive bus pass program already operating; a decrease in King County and downtown employment reducing employer interest in “something new”; the difficulty of reaching smaller employers without transportation coordinators; and a core of employees believing they must have a car for work. Another key finding is building and parking management wanted to keep tenants and maintain revenues with office vacancies on the rise and parking prices appearing to decrease. Building owners were reluctant to renegotiate tenant leases to change monthly parking spaces, suggesting cash out may be viable only where demand outstrips supply, and spaces can be sold daily. Finally, employer transportation coordinators said cash out added size and complexity to a significant existing package of employer TDM measures. Clearly, cash out requires a particular market fit to work. Summary
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