Bill Hahn – Project Manager

Maricopa County Department of Transportation

1. Evacuation Plan Status: What is the status of your agency’s existing evacuation plan? For example, when was it first developed and when was it last revised? Has it ever been used in an actual emergency situation? Who has the authority to issue evacuation orders?
   
   The Maricopa County Department of Transportation works closely with the Maricopa County Department of Emergency Management. Phase I of the Maricopa County Emergency Evacuation Strategy Plan was completed in July 2004 (Phase II is currently being developed). Phase I was developed as a template strategy for local agencies to use in developing their own plans.
   
   The Regional Emergency Action Coordinating Team (REACT) is an incident management group created by MCDOT in 2001. REACT is dispatched frequently to take care of traffic control related issues wherever an incident occurs along any of the county’s major roadways.
   
   At the county level, Dave Smith (County Manager) has the authority to issue evacuation orders. It is presumed that Warren Leek (Director of Maricopa County Department of Emergency Management) would send the order up the chain to Dave Smith. If the evacuation involves multiple counties, the order will come from someone at the State level, most likely the governor.

2. Scope of the Plan: What is the scope of the plan with regard to geographic coverage, agency involvement, and presence of transportation elements? Are plans for evacuation transportation management separate from or a part of the general emergency plan?
   
   Phase I is a general evacuation strategy plan that deals specifically with evacuation scenarios within Maricopa County. Phase II (currently in development) will consider the evacuation of all of Maricopa County, as well as the ingress scenario involving evacuations from other cities into Maricopa County, Phoenix, in particular.
   
   Plans for evacuation transportation management are part of the overall general emergency plan, but they make up a very large portion of the plan.

3. Plan Scenarios: What types of scenarios are the plans meant to address? Can they be applied to no-notice, advance-notice, and/or special event emergency evacuations? Do they have provisions for naturally occurring, accidental, and/or terrorist events?
   
   See Question 2 for Phase I scenarios. Phase II can be applied to all of the above and more (e.g. ingress scenario). There will be provisions for naturally occurring, accidental, and/or terrorist events in the Phase II document.

4. Capacity Needs and Availability: Have any models, computer simulations, or other calculations been performed to estimate capacity needs of the transportation system during an evacuation? How much additional capacity is expected to result from emergency measures that are to be put in place (e.g., contraflow lanes, signal pattern changes)?
   
   Phase I only dealt with two scenarios in two selected areas of the Phoenix Valley, so the results are not necessarily reflective of a full evacuation scenario. Maricopa County depends on the ADOT White Paper as a basis for its capacity demand numbers in the event of a mass evacuation. Bill did indicate, however, that the high-level calculations used in the White Paper still need work. These calculations do not take into consideration certain key issues such as road closures as a result of some catastrophic event.

5. Traffic Control Practices: What is the role of transportation agencies in traffic management and control? What traffic control practices are designated by the plan for use in an evacuation? Examples include pre-established evacuation routes, contraflow, evacuation phasing, regulation of type or number of vehicles (including transit), optimization of signal patterns and lane use, mitigation of work zone impacts, and suspension of tolls and fares.
   
   Many of these issues are still being worked out in the Phase II document. Currently, a majority of the Phoenix Valley’s TMCs are linked back to the ADOT TMC. In the event of a multi-jurisdictional or statewide emergency evacuation, there is an agreement in place among all valley cities to relinquish control to ADOT.

6. Role of ITS: What intelligent transportation system (ITS) components and other related traffic management tools are used in the evacuation plan? How, when, and why are they each used as part of the evacuation plan? Do you have redundant systems? Can you operate the ITS elements from any location other than the TMC? Examples of ITS components include surveillance cameras, variable message signs (VMS), highway advisory radio (HAR), 511 or other traveler information systems (phone and/or Web), interconnected traffic signal systems, high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, ramp metering, traffic signal priority for buses, and vehicle detection systems.
   
   Some of the ITS components used by the county include DMS, freeway and arterial CCTV cameras, portable DMS, etc. Bill believes that the trucking industry could play a critical role in the event of an emergency mass evacuation. Trucks could be used as traffic barriers, transport vehicles, and communications posts.
   
   None of the valley’s TMCs can currently be operated from locations other than the TMC itself. Bill does anticipate that, in the future, TMCs will be operated from Emergency Operation Centers as well.

7. Resources and Materials: What is the role of transportation agencies in identifying resource needs and in providing resources or materials? How do they assist in transportation service coordination?
   
   These issues are being addressed in the Phase II document. The county has identified many resource needs such as emergency centers, temporary hospitals, and shelters along the evacuation routes. The special needs populations (nursing homes, incarcerated individuals, etc.) will need to be taken into consideration as well. This type of coordination will need to take place among various tiers of government.

8. Evacuation Control, Coordination, and Management: Is an incident command system (ICS) used? How are transportation needs and resources, and the role of transportation agencies, integrated into the ICS? How are operations coordinated between TMCs, transit agencies, EOCs, and other agencies? Do you have plans for the re-entry of evacuees after the evacuation? How do you accommodate special needs evacuees (seniors, nursing home residents, hospital patients, inmates, people with pets, etc.)?
   
   An ICS is used.
   
   Various cities throughout the valley are currently in the process of workshopping re-entry plans for the “regular” and special needs evacuees.

9. Communications Between Agencies: What are the communications protocols between agencies? Are there established procedures for disseminating information quickly and accurately to personnel?
   
   Some of the current communications protocols are outdated and in the process of being updated. As far as disseminating information quickly and accurately to personnel, there are currently no established procedures, but this is something that should be addressed in the Phase II document.

10. Communications with Evacuees: Is the public educated in advance about the evacuation procedures? What information is provided and how is the information disseminated? Do transportation agencies have a specific role in media coordination and traveler information dissemination, either before or during an evacuation? Is information coordinated between agencies and/or centralized before being delivered to the media?  
    
    The public is not educated in advance. The general public may not be concerned because they have never experienced a mass evacuation in the valley before.
    
    Transportation agencies do have a specific role in media coordination before and during an evacuation because a lot of information will be coming from the TMCs.
    
    Bill currently has no answer to the question regarding coordination and/or centralization of information being delivered to the media.

11. Testing and Training Procedures: How often are testing/training exercises conducted? Who do these exercises involve? What drill scenarios have been used?
    
    Emergency personnel (e.g., EMT, fire service, police service) are frequently involved in testing/training exercises. The problem is trying to figure out who should be included in the training pool. Should TMC officials and personnel, as well as EOC officials and personnel, be included in the same training exercises as other emergency personnel?
    
    The evacuation-related drills that are currently conducted on a frequent basis involve the Palo Verde nuclear plant, various dam breaks, and forest fire drills.

12. Evaluation of Exercises: What aspects of the evacuation plan were implemented well in drill situations, and what aspects of the plan were found to require improvement? What elements of the plan were most useful for a successful evacuation drill? What lessons have been learned as a result of these drills?
    
    As mentioned in Question 11, no mass evacuation drills have been conducted. The REACT team has received great feedback for their work on the valley freeways as well as the Phoenix International Raceway (PIR). The REACT team has helped reduce the time it takes to exit PIR from 12 hours to 2.5 hours. However, the few number of REACT vehicles would be overwhelmed in event of a mass evacuation.
    
    Good pre-planning, and having intelligent, motivated, and dedicated staff who are very familiar with the plan and its goals are a few key elements of a successful plan. If the staff is prepared to react to issues before they become major problems, things are likely to go much smother.

13. Evaluation of Evacuations: If the evacuation plan has ever been used in an actual evacuation, how successful was its implementation? To what extent was the evacuation simply monitored, rather than managed, by responding agencies? What aspects of the plan were implemented well in the actual emergency situation, and what aspects were found to require improvement? What elements of the plan were most useful for a successful evacuation?
    
    The Maricopa County Emergency Evacuation Strategy Plan has never actually been put to use in the valley, but a smaller evacuation plan in Palo Verde was a few years ago.
    
    The Palo Verde evacuation (as a result of having to shut down one of the reactors) was handled poorly. There was a lack of communication among plant staff/management, emergency responders, and evacuees.

14. After-Action Report: What is the process for post-evacuation evaluation? Is the post-incident review a collaborative effort among all agencies that were involved?
    
    Still in development.

15. Incorporation of Lessons Learned: Have the lessons learned in testing/training exercises and in real evacuations resulted in revisions to the emergency evacuation plan? Have the lessons learned resulted in changes in personnel training?
    
    Mainly, the lessons learned from real evacuations in other cities have resulted in revisions to the emergency evacuation strategy plan.
    
    Bill believes that lessons learned have likely resulted in changes in personnel training, but he’s not certain.

16. Conclusions: What specific recommendations do you have regarding management of traffic during evacuations for another agency developing or improving upon their own emergency evacuation plans?  
    
    Bill believes that funding is a major issue. The money is there to be spent, but the people in charge of spending it are reluctant. These individuals are afraid of being ridiculed for making bad spending decisions. Bill feels that key individuals in the planning, as well as execution, phases of the emergency evacuation plan need to be trained in risk management. These people need to be able to make critical decisions in a short period of time with little to no guidance from superiors. These individuals need to be assured that they will not be held personally responsible for any decisions made (within the realm of common sense) that result in injury or death to the general public.
    
    Public planning individuals need to think more outside the box.

June 26, 2006
Publication #FHWA-HOP-08-016