5.9.2 Highway
-
“Develop a Consistent Policy for Toll and Fare Collection – Different authorities and operating agencies suspended tolls and fares, while others did not.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout New York City
-
“Establish and Disseminate a Policy for Displaying Messages on Variable Message Signs – Members of the I-95 Corridor Coalition have developed some consistent messages for message signs. Permanently mounted variable message signs operated by INFORM staff lost power. Staff, however, deployed 28 portable signs and changed the messages on others.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout New York City
-
Know Your Infrastructure and Reengineer as Necessary – “Use of contra-flow lanes, removable barriers, electronic signs for the contra-flow lanes, (and) station workers with wreckers to remove cars that breakdown.”
Homeland Response, “Evacuation: What We Can Learn—and Cannot Learn—from Hurricanes”
-
“Leverage the United States Geologic Service (USGS) Streamgaging Programming”
A Study of the Impact of Nine Transportation Management Projects on Hurricane Evacuation Preparedness
-
Reduce the Impact of Work Zones – “A historically overlooked issue in evacuation planning and preparedness has been highway work zones. In 1998, during the evacuation for Hurricane Georges, the States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana all had construction zones on evacuation routes. In Louisiana, evacuation traffic on westbound I-10 out of New Orleans was limited to a single lane.
Since the need for maintenance and construction during the hurricane season is unavoidable, some Departments of Transportation’s have made attempts to avoid conflicts by adding special provisions in construction contracts to accommodate evacuation traffic through work zones. The most common way to do this has been to add clauses that require a contractor to cease all construction activities once an evacuation is declared, clear all equipment, and open all lanes of traffic including those under construction.”
National Review of Hurricane Evacuation Plans and Policies
-
“Understand the Function of Your Roadway System – Transportation managers made several key decisions throughout the blackout. One was to close some lanes of traffic within some tunnels. Because the tunnels’ ventilation systems did not have backup power, managers had to reduce the number of cars to reduce the amounts of pollutants.
At the same time, however, it was imperative that the tunnels remain open to allow the passage of emergency vehicles. Other facility operators modified the lane configuration for some bridges and tunnels. They reversed one lane so that there would be three lanes for traffic leaving Manhattan and one used to enter the area. This action helped address the amount of vehicles leaving Manhattan.
New York Police Department supervisors instructed their 2,000 traffic agents to stop issuing summons and assigned all of them to direct traffic. This action was possible because there was less congestion on the freeway system than on the arterial streets.
INFORM staff also had to decide whether to operate the drawbridges under their jurisdiction. Some were in the up position when the blackout occurred. They set a priority of ensuring that evacuation routes remained open. Therefore, they lowered the bridges using emergency power generators, locked them down, and notified the Coast Guard, who then notified boaters.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout New York City
February 7, 2006
Publication #FHWA–HOP-08-015