7.15 What Worked and What Did Not Work
Evacuations as a result of the incidents were successful; however, as with any emergency, some things worked well and others did not. The following is a summary of this information by the categories of advance planning, coordination, and communication.
- Ability to adapt to an ever-changing and growing incident
- Mountain Area Safety Taskforce (MAST)
- Practice and experience of various entities
- Pre-established roadblock equipment
- Preplanning, training and drills
- Pre-established relationships among entities
- State of readiness of the local emergency planning committee and knowledge of an eventual major disaster event
- Training exercises—inclusion of hospital in tabletop exercises
- Training of first responders in incident command
- Unified incident command
- Use of the 2-1-1 system for social services
- Use of the national incident management system.
- Cooperation of the railroads
- Development of relationships with other entities
- Establishment of an incident command quickly
- One person in charge and delegation of responsibilities
- Overall cooperation of the entities involved
- Quick implementation of an incident command center
- Use of the national response plan.
- Information to the media and the public
- Joint information center
- Media web page.
- Not all involved entities were represented at the incident command center
- Staff assignments
- No identification of all of the chemicals located in the rail car
- No reentry plan
- Pumping of the rail car before the identification of the chemicals
- Sample material did not match the rail car manifest.
- Internal bickering over leadership of the incident command
- Duplication of effort.
- Acquisition of information from others
- No utilization of existing ITS technology
- No official evacuation notice to a nursing home
- Stopped communication.
February 6, 2006